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INTRODUCTION
The human nervous system contains numerous visual pathways, suggesting that visual information
is represented differently for different purposes. For example, an influential view holds that two
separate but interacting processing streams result in vision for action and vision for perception
(Milner and Goodale, 1995). Although much evidence in support of this view comes from
patient studies (Milner et al., 1991), studies with healthy participants suggest that processing of
visual information for perception and action (e.g., eye movements) can be dissociated (Spering
et al., 2011). Most studies of perception use stimuli that are consciously perceived; however,
the possibility of unconscious perception continues to intrigue the research community. In this
paper I critically examine a large body of evidence for unconscious perception in healthy human
participants obtained through a variety of methods that render stimuli invisible (Kim and Blake,
2005; Breitmeyer, 2015). Most researchers in the field have not been convinced by few authors
skeptical about unconscious perception (Dulany, 1997; Holender and Duscherer, 2004; Peters et al.,
2017). Here I question evidence for unconscious perception based on some general principles of
studying mechanisms of biological pathways.
I do not address studies on patients with disorders of awareness such as blindsight, neglect,
and visual agnosias. It is difficult to establish the absence of phenomenology from patients’
reports because of response bias. Additionally, there is always a possibility that brain damage
affects patients’ reports of conscious perception. Furthermore, some recent studies cast doubt
on the absence of phenomenology in these patients. For example, a recent study that used a
graded measure of awareness, suggests that stimuli in blindsight patients might in fact be weakly
consciously perceived (Mazzi et al., 2016).
Unconscious perception has been purportedly demonstrated in a number of studies (for
excellent reviews see Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Faivre et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2014; Yang
et al., 2014). These studies have been plagued with methodological problems that still linger and
repeatedly cast doubt on the validity of the phenomenon itself. Here, I suggest that we should focus
on a different question. Sidestepping for the moment issues with measuring awareness, what can
we say about unconscious perception?
HOW POWERFUL IS UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION?
The possibility of unconscious perception has intrigued scholars since the beginning of
experimental psychology (Peirce and Jastrow, 1884; Sidis, 1898). By using masking to prevent
conscious perception of the stimulus, Marcel was the first to demonstrate unconscious semantic
priming, in which a semantically related prime affects processing of the target word (Marcel,
1983b). He proposed that unconscious perception redescribes sensory data to the highest possible
level of description available to the organism (Marcel, 1983a). More recently, some authors have
proposed that above-chance performance in a perceptual discrimination task in the absence
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of stimulus awareness provides strong evidence for unconscious
perception (Peters and Lau, 2015). To agree on what constitutes
evidence for unconscious perception, a definition of perception
is needed. Several definitions have been proposed. To dissociate
perception from consciousness, it has been suggested that
perception involves extraction of perceptual information from
a stimulus (Kanwisher, 2001). For example, when viewing an
ambiguous Necker cube, the percept alternates between two
states, yet the stimulus itself does not change. Others have further
suggested that the definition of perception includes perceptual
constancies (Burge, 2010). It has been also proposed that to count
as perception, such representations should be available for the
control and guidance of action (Dretske, 2006). Although there
is no universally accepted definition, I will, for the purposes of
this paper, adopt a definition of perception that has in similar
form been suggested before (Kanwisher, 2001; Dretske, 2006;
Burge, 2010) and discuss studies that meet this definition. By
perception, I mean the extraction of perceptual information
(including perceptual constancies) that is represented at the
personal or more broadly, organismal (individual) level and can
be used for the control and guidance of action. For example,
suppose that the word CLAP is perceived unconsciously and
prompts observer to clap. That would be a clear example of
unconscious perception; I return to this example later when I
compare conscious and unconscious perception.
An important set of results, relevant to the issue of
unconscious perception, comes from the electroencephalography
(EEG) studies on automatic change detection. Our nervous
systems represent statistical regularities and automatically detect
novel or surprising events. This phenomenon is known in the
auditory domain as mismatch negativity (MMN; vMMN in the
visual domain) (for a review see Stefanics et al., 2014) and the
neural system generating MMN is considered a primitive system
of intelligence (Näätänen et al., 2001). Considered a perceptual
prediction error, vMMN can be elicited even by changes in
complex stimulus attributes, such as facial emotions (Susac et al.,
2004; Zhao and Li, 2006) or laterality of body parts (Stefanics
and Czigler, 2012). It is well known that MMN can be elicited
even in sleep (Nashida et al., 2000; Atienza and Cantero, 2001;
Stefanics et al., 2007, 2009) or in comatose patients (Kane et al.,
1993, 1996; Fischer et al., 1999), suggesting that complex visual
information processing occurs in the absence of awareness,
although some recent studies suggest that perceptual awareness
might be necessary for vMMN generation (Flynn et al., 2017).
Because most vMMN studies do not collect behavioral data, we
currently do not have evidence that visual processing indexed
by MMN can guide action and this type of processing currently
does not meet the definition of perception adopted in this paper.
Similarly, other studies that report only differences in neural
activity, do not provide evidence for unconscious perception. We
now turn to evidence for unconscious perception from studies
that employ a dissociation paradigm.
Various paradigms have been developed to demonstrate
unconscious perception (reviewed in Merikle et al., 2001).
The majority of studies of unconscious perception employ a
dissociation paradigm, which in the most general form requires
dissociation of two measures, a measure of conscious perception
and a measure of unconscious perception (Schmidt and Vorberg,
2006). Themost popular is a simple dissociation paradigm, which
requires demonstration of unconscious perception in the absence
of conscious perception, typically achieved by the bottom-up
suppression of target stimuli.
For studies with healthy subjects, researchers can choose from
a variety of methods to render stimuli invisible (Kim and Blake,
2005; Breitmeyer, 2015). Most studies however employ some
form of visual masking in which a mask follows a brief stimulus
presentation, preventing its conscious perception (Breitmeyer
and Ögmen, 2006). Unconscious perception of the stimulus is
then demonstrated through an indirect effect such as priming,
in which a prime stimulus affects a response to the subsequently
presented target. Masked priming studies provided evidence for
unconscious perception of simple stimulus features such as color
or shape (Neumann and Klotz, 1994; Breitmeyer et al., 2004;
Ro et al., 2009). Using masking as well as other approaches that
allow for longer stimulus presentation times such as continuous
flash suppression (CFS) (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005) or crowding
(Korte, 1923; Flom et al., 1963; Bouma, 1970), more complex
stimulus features such as facial identity and emotional expression
have been demonstrated to occur unconsciously (reviewed in
Axelrod et al., 2015). Climbing the complexity ladder, we have
strong evidence for unconscious semantic priming (Dehaene
et al., 1998; Naccache and Dehaene, 2001) and even unconscious
inhibition, which is a form of cognitive control previously
believed to require awareness (van Gaal et al., 2008, 2010, 2012).
Taken together, the evidence seems to suggest that most of our
perception, if not all, can occur unconsciously.
Presented this way, unconscious perception seems to have few
limits, suggesting that the role of consciousness might be minor.
Furthermore, to prevent conscious perception, researchers use
one of the many techniques that are available (Kim and
Blake, 2005; Breitmeyer, 2015). Because each method affects
unconscious perception to a different degree, every unconscious
perception is unconscious in its own way. It is possible that
with a different or improved method, the limits of unconscious
perception will be further expanded.
EVERY UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION IS
UNCONSCIOUS IN ITS OWN WAY
Because multiple paradigms are rarely used within one study,
conclusions about unconscious perception are usually based on
one experimental paradigm. In masking studies for example, a
stimulus is presented only for tens of milliseconds and then
masked with another stimulus of longer duration. Failure to
demonstrate unconscious perception might be attributed to
limited stimulus processing. Although some other techniques,
such as CFS (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), allow for longer
presentation times, stimulus processing is strongly affected by
simultaneous presentation of noise to one eye, while stimulus is
presented to the other eye.
Some studies directly compared different experimental
paradigms using the same stimuli. For example, Fogelson et al.
(2014) collected fMRI data while subjects viewed images of faces
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and tools. Images were rendered invisible using either CFS or
chromatic flicker fusion (CFF), in which two oppositely colored
images are presented to both eyes, at a frequency that results
in image fusion and perception of uniform color. Category
information about CFS suppressed stimuli was recovered only
from the occipital cortex, whereas category information about
CFF suppressed stimuli, was also recovered from temporal and
frontal regions, suggesting that stimuli are processed differently
under different suppression methods. Although neural activity
by itself is not evidence for unconscious perception, this study
demonstrates important methodological constraints.
These considerations seem to allow two important
conclusions. First, it is premature to conclude that a specific
stimulus cannot be perceived unconsciously if only one
experimental approach has been tested. Second, stimuli for
which unconscious perception has not been demonstrated might
still be perceived unconsciously with an improved or novel
paradigm that would eliminate conscious perception but have
minimal effect on unconscious perception.
I will now propose that the approach of using different
experimental paradigms to interfere with visual processing,
leading to conscious perception of a stimulus, can be compared
to methodology of interfering with cellular pathways leading to
a specific end product. I chose as an example, bacterial signal
transduction leading to formation of a dormant structure, called
a spore (Hilbert and Piggot, 2004), but any other complex
biological process would serve just as well. When viewed from
this perspective, very different conclusions can bemade about the
role of unconscious perception.
DISRUPTING CELLULAR PATHWAYS VS.
DISRUPTING VISUAL PROCESSING
When faced with environmental stress, bacterium B. subtilis has
at its disposal a variety of responses; the most extreme form
of stress adaptation is the formation of a dormant, heat and
radiation resistant, multilayered spore (Hilbert and Piggot, 2004).
Sporulation pathway can be examined by disrupting different
processing stages. One classical approach is to use mutagenesis,
which affects cells at the level of DNA. Using mutagenesis, the
formation of the spore can be modified or completely prevented.
Each mutation leaves the upstream processing intact; in other
words, even when cells fail to produce spores, parts of regulatory
network remain active. In this analogy, the sporulation process
corresponds to visual processing and a complete spore as the
end product corresponds to a conscious percept in vision. An
unconscious percept, which is considered to have all of the
qualities of a conscious percept except for observers not being
conscious of it, corresponds to a spore with all of its components
except for the outermost layer.
How should we best describe processes that occur in
sporulation mutants? When masking a briefly presented visual
stimulus, we sometimes describe our visual experience as partial
awareness (Kouider et al., 2010). In the absence of awareness,
any visual processing that is preserved and measured through
indirect measures such as priming, is described as unconscious
or subliminal perception. Sporulation researchers feel no need
to invent new terms to describe processing in the absence of a
complete spore as the end product. Mutations simply affect the
sporulation process at a specific stage. To make the comparison
to visual perception even more concrete, let us consider one
of the techniques used for visual suppression, called motion-
induced blindness (MIB) (Bonneh et al., 2001). In MIB, a
rotating mask intermittently suppresses conscious perception of
a target stimulus. It has been demonstrated that target-specific
suppression occurs specifically in visual area V4; in no other early
visual areas (V1–V3) is suppression significant (Donner et al.,
2008). The role of the rotating mask in suppressing the target
in MIB is analogous to the role of a mutation in preventing
sporulation. It seems most parsimonious then to conclude that
different techniques that prevent conscious perception of stimuli
simply interfere with visual processing at a specific level. What
remains is just residual visual processing. Do we have any reason
to call that residual visual processing unconscious perception? To
answer this question, we need to examine the effects of putative
unconscious perception at the level of the organism a little closer.
VISUAL PERCEPTION AT THE LEVEL OF
THE ORGANISM
Visual perception evolved to guide successful behavior and to
promote survival. Conscious visual perception allows us to
perform complex tasks and to explore our environment. How
does unconscious perception compare? Let’s examine a very
simple, hypothetical task, in which a participant is presented with
a single word and instructed to perform the action specified by
it. Words are presented in isolation or masked. Let’s say that the
first non-masked word is STAND. We don’t expect any difficulty
for the participant to follow the instructions; no one would be
surprised to see the participant stand up. Now imagine that next,
the masked word is CLAP. Because the word is masked, it is
not visible to participant; however it should be processed and
perceived unconsciously. What do we expect? If the participant
suddenly starts clapping, we would be amazed. Indeed, there is
no evidence that such a simple task can be performed if the word
is perceived unconsciously.
We are left with the effect of unconsciously perceived stimuli
on reaction times and accuracy in priming studies. We therefore
have evidence for unconscious perception that is mostly based on
modulation of reaction times in a highly constrained and limited
tasks. From this perspective a very different picture emerges, far
from being powerful and rich, unconscious perception seems
very limited and weak at best.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
VISION RESEARCH
Always controversial, unconscious perception has been proposed
to be powerful and rich. However, upon closer inspection,
it becomes evident that we can’t do much with stimuli
perceived unconsciously. Demonstrations of unconscious
perception are based on paradigms that interfere with
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visual processing and can be compared to other studies
that disrupt cellular networks, such as the sporulation
process in bacteria. Cellular manipulations of the sporulation
network prevent formation of spores, yet leave parts of the
sporulation process intact. By analogy, the most parsimonious
conclusion is that the effect of putative unconscious
perception on our behavior only represents residual visual
processing.
If we accept the idea that putative unconscious perception is
in fact residual visual processing, what are the implications for
vision research? Should we abandon research on unconscious
perception? A large part of the enterprise of discovering neural
correlates of consciousness is based on comparing differences in
neural activity between unconscious and conscious perception.
Does accepting the proposed idea invalidate this paradigm? I
think the answer to both questions is no.
Just as mutagenesis is an extremely useful tool for uncovering
the architecture of cellular pathways, masking and other
paradigms can reveal something about the architecture of
visual processing. As we explore in more detail the mechanism
and levels at which different suppression techniques disrupt
visual processing, we can learn about the process that results
in conscious visual perception. Ideally, we might be able
to demonstrate and characterize different processing stages,
predicted by cognitive and computational models. At the same
time, we should be careful to avoid the temptation to label
such processing unconscious perception, unless we have good
independent reasons to do so.
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